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YOU LIVE, YOU LEARN: A COMMENT ON
OKLAHOMA'S YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ACT
I. INTRODUCTION

Getting tough on crime and creating a catchy slogan to that effect has been both
popular and effective in recent political campaigns. One example is the 1994
Congressional elections in which the Republicans gained control of both the House
of Representatives and the Senate. Part of the nationwide Republican campaign, the
so-called "Contract With America," was aimed at-the creation of stricter crime
fighting measures. A year later, former California governor Pete Wilson began his
bid for the 1996 Republican Presidential nomination by introducing all sorts of "get
tough on crime" measures in California, including the famous "three strikes, you're
out" legislation.' But the popularity of this trend precluded it from being merely a
partisan strategy. Indeed, President Clinton introduced his own "get tough" crimebill
back in 1994, which helped to diffuse any serious argument by the Republicans that
the President was "soft" on crime.' This trend toward punishment and retribution,
or "just-desserts," for criminals has been wildly popular with voters; a candidatewho
is seen by voters to be soft on crime most likely will have plenty of free time, come
November.
One of the major areas of law which has been affected by get tough measures
is juvenile delinquent law. In some variation or another, provisions allowing
"children in the eyes of the law" to be punished as adults have been in effect since
the first written code of laws.4 As noted by at least one author, however, the goals
and effects of laws relating to juvenile crime have undergone a cyclical change.'
First, at a time when juvenile crime is seen by the public as being extremely high, the
punishments imposed upon delinquents become more and more harsh.6 Second,
reports about the harsh, but ineffective, treatment of juveniles may sway legislatures
to adopt more flexible and lenient treatment measures, aimed at the rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders.' Third, when these rehabilitative measures are seen by the public

1. Journalist Edward Humes gave an account of Governor Wilson's "get tough" strategy from the other side, so
to speak. While Wilson was preparing for his run at the Republican presidential nomination, Humes was working in
ajuvenile detention facility in Los Angeles, teaching a writing class for those children in detention who volunteered to
beintheclass. See EDWARDHUMES,NOMATIER HowLouDI SHOur AYEARINTIELIEoFJVENILECouRT(1996).

2. See Crime Bill Passes,TIm, Sept. 5,1994, at 15.
3. Toavoidconfusion,this paperuses the term"juvenile(s)" throughout, except when this term would conflictwith
statutorily prescribed language.
4. See CLFORDE. SMONSEN & MARSHALLS. GORDON 11I,JVE
tEJuscEINAMEmmCA 4 (2d ed. 1982).
5. See THOMASJ. BENARD, TH CYIycEOFJuvamzJusDcE (1992).
6. See id.at3.
7. See id.
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as failing to bring about a reduction in juvenile crime, pressure is placed on
legislators to enact or reenact measures that will serve to punish juveniles for criminal
activity and deter further crimes.' "At every stage of the cycle, justice officials and
the general public believe three ideas: that juvenile crime is at an exceptionally high
level, that present juvenile justice policies make theproblem worse, and that changing
9
these policies will reduce juvenile crime."
The Oklahoma legislature passed the Youthful Offender Act'o in 1994, partially
in response to the local and nationwide views that the juvenile crime rate was
exceptionally high. " Implementation, however, was dependent upon funding. Then,
in May of 1997, the Oklahoma legislature provided the necessary funding; the Act
and accompanying changes in the Oklahoma Juvenile Code went into effect on
January 1, 1998.12 Although several of the changes made to the Oklahoma juvenile
justice system by this Act seem to mirror the national trend of providing harsher
punishments for younger children, the Oklahoma legislation actually provides a
framework through which rehabilitation may be emphasized.
This paper analyzes thehistorical development ofjuvenlelaw in Parts I through
V, focusing on key developments that still are relevant today. Part VI gives an
account of the current state of juvenile law in Oklahoma, based primarily on the new
Youthful Offender Act. Part VII combines critical analysis of the new laws with
suggestions for implementation. These suggestions combine ideas from legal
commentators and social scientists to fit within the framework of the Youthful
Offender Act. This paper concludes with the idea that the Youthful Offender Act and
accompanying legislation provide a viable framework for breaking the cycle of
juvenile justice, but only if the courts identify and respond to certain problem areas.
A brief history of juvenile justice and how it has developed in America, and in
Oklahoma specifically, will be a necessary background for the focus of this paper.
II. HISTORICAL SEPARATION BETWEEN ADULT AND JUVENILE OFFENSES
Research into the historical treatment of juveniles by the law has established as
a relative constant the fact that juveniles who have been accused of criminal acts have
been treated as separate from their adult counterparts.' 3 That is not to say, however,
that juveniles were not subject to severe sanctions, including capital punishment, but
only that separate laws existed to govern juvenile crimes.' 4 The Hammurabic Code,
considered by most scholars to be the first written code of laws, circa 2270 BC,

8. See id. at 4.
9. Id.

10. 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 290, §§ 18-29.
11. See generally Bill Braun, Teen Sentenced to PrisonTerm in Boy's Death,TULSA WORLD, Oct. 1, 1997, at
B1; Mike Coppock, Juvenile Crime on Rise in Enid,TULSA WORLD, July 20, 1995, at N9.
12. See OKLA.STA. tit. 10, § 7306-2.1 (Supp. 1997).
13. See SONSEN & GORDON, supra note 4, at 15. Although the definition a "juvenile" varied from culture to
culture, and often within a culture over the course of time, the fact ofhaving separate laws pertaining to those defined
by law as "juveniles" remained a constant.
14. See id. at 6-7.
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contained separate provisions for children who committed crimes. 5 More recently,
separate laws governing juvenile offenders developed in the English common law,
from the Middle Ages, through the Industrial Revolution, to today.' 6
The treatment of juveniles in colonial American courts mirrored the treatment
by common law courts in England. 17 In both systems, categories of crimes and
punishments demonstrated the influence of religion upon law-making. The harsh
penalties imposed pursuant to codes of law thousands of years old were still used, but
were tailored to the prevailing religious beliefs.' Imprisonment, corporal, even
capital punishments for juveniles were not new, but the underlying rationales changed
over the years. Although mandated under a separate set of rules which only pertained
to persons under a certain age, punishment of juveniles was often as strict and harsh
as punishment of adults. 9 Indeed, "[olne scholar has documented 22 executions,
between 1642 and 1899, for crimes committed [by persons] under the age of 16. " 20
Juveniles were governed by separate rules, but were not regarded as "requir[ing] any
special protections or discrete legal status."2'
During the mid- 1800s, the "Progressive" movement inAmerica and the Western
world began to call for social and political reform.' As a reaction to the prior harsh
treatment of juveniles and the lack of legal recognition of inherent differences between
juveniles and adults, two related rationales for reform of the juvenile justice system
became popular. The first was the basic idea that juveniles, by virtue of youth and
inexperience, should not be held as culpable as adults in most circumstances.' The
second viewpoint embraced the idea that early influences upon juveniles may have
been most responsible for later criminal behavior. 24 "Progressives emphasized
reforming the offender rather than punishing on the basis of the offense." However,
when the legislature recognized that juveniles did require special protections and a
discrete legal status, they would also have to recognize that those characteristics
could not be provided by the then current justice system. Because the Progressive
movement concluded that juveniles should not be held as culpable as adults, new
methods for the treatment of juveniles by the American justice system would have to
be developed. A necessary part of this determination was that a new method for

15. See id. at4.
16. Seeid.at6-10.
17. See id. at l8.
18. See id. In this section, the authors note, among others, a particularly nasty provision in the 1648 Massachusetts
Code, "[i]f
any child, or children, above sixteen years old, and of sufficient understanding, shall CURSE, or SMITE

their natural FATHER, or MOTHER: he or they shall be put to death: unles [sic] it can be sufficiently testified that
the parents have been unchristianly negligent." Id. at 18-19.
19. See SMIONSEN &GORDON, supra note 4, at 18-2 1.
20. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,864 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Victor L. Streib, Death
PenaltyforChildren: TheAmerican Experiencewith CapitalPunishmentforCrimes Committed While UnderAge
Eighteen, 360KLA.L.REv. 613,619 (1983)).
21.

BARRYC.FELD, JUcEFORCHI.DREN9 (1993).

22.
23.
24.
25.

See id. at 9.
See id. at 10-11.
See id.
Id.
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diagnosing and treating the cause of juvenile criminal behavior would be required.2 6
Ill. IMPACT OF THE SEPARATE COURT SYSTEM

"Current opinion place[d] the birth of our juvenile justice system in Cook
County, Illinois, at around 1899 ....The ideological underpinnings of the early
juvenile court movement centered on a concern for the welfare of children and an
emphasis on specialized, noncriminal treatment of youths."27 This first separate
juvenile court was established through the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899.' The
Act created a system that ignored the privileges given to adult criminal defendants
and focused specifically on rehabilitation. 29 Even the language in the new court
system was changed: "proceedings were initiated by a petition in the welfare of the
child, rather than by criminal complaint or indictment"; "youths were found to be
delinquent rather than guilty of an offense"; and instead of being sentenced, youths
faced "disposition" upon a finding of delinquency.30 The result of these changes was
a totally new justice system in which the state, through the judge and state welfare
workers, became the de facto parents of juveniles, under the legal rationale ofparens
patriae.3 t "Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care
of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if
'
parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae."32
The system first established by Illinois in 1899 rapidly proliferated throughout
the United States.3 3 Although the popularity of the new juvenile court system
originally was based upon the rationale of the Progressives, other factors increased
popularity as the system began to expand. One such factor was the fact that
rehabilitation was not limited to traditionally criminal offenses. "Because the
reformers eschewed punishment, they could regulate behavior such as smoking,
sexual precocity, truancy, immorality, stubbornness, vagrancy, or living a wayward,
idle, and dissolute life."34 Anything that was seen as possibly contributing to the
delinquency ofjuveniles would be regulated. Although these "status offenses" would
not be criminal if engaged in by adults, the state, as "parent" for all juveniles, had

26. See generallySIMONSEN & GORDON, supra note 4, at 26-29; FELD, supranote 21, at 12-14.
27. SIMONSEN & GORDON, supra note 4, at 27.
28. See id.
29.
The purpose of the statutes creating juvenile courts was not to provide additional courts for the
punishment of crime; rather, the purpose is to establish special tribunals having jurisdiction within
prescribed limits, ofcases relating to the moral, physical, and mental well-being of children to the
end that they may be directed away from paths of crime.
Id. at 171.
30. FELD,supranote 21, at 16; see also HaMEs, supranote 1, at 377.
31. See FaD,supranote 21, at 13. Feld defined this Latin phrase as, "the right and responsibility of the state to

substitute its own control over children for that of the natural parents when the latter were unable or unwilling to meet
their responsibilities or when the child posed a community crime problem" Id.
32. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,825 (1988) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,265 (1984)).
33. See SUIONSE& GORDON, supra note 4, at 27. The authors noted that "[b]y 1917, juvenile court legislation
was a reality in all but three states, and by 1932 there were estimated to be over 600 independent juvenile courts in the
United States. By 1945, there were juvenile courts in every state in the country." Id.
34. VELD,supranote 21, at 14.
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jurisdiction over these acts.35
Another factor in the popularity of the juvenile court system was the increase
in control over lower-class juveniles.36 Children of immigrants and of the poor often
were raised in a different system of beliefs than the prevailing system. Juvenile laws,
as all laws, were based upon systemic norms. To fulfill its function as the ultimate
parent, the state would have
to rehabilitate these juveniles so that they could function
37
appropriately in society.
A final factor in the popularity of the new juvenile court was the ease by which
its "informal" procedures could be implemented. The state could be made aware of
possible juvenile delinquent behavior by victims, teachers, parents, or law-enforcement officers. 8 Once one of these parties invoked the powers of the juvenile court,
the state, through the juvenile court judge and state social workers, weighed
delinquency, and imposed a disposition in thejuvenile's "best interest. ' 39 The system
discouraged the presence of attorneys for the children in juvenile proceedings "as both
irrelevant and an impediment to [the] 'child-saving' mission." ° Technicalities and
formalities were largely abolished to facilitate understanding by juveniles, and "to
enable the judge to best control and guide his or her wards."4' 1 Consequently,
proceedings in the new court system were faster, cheaper, and easier to understand.
However, these same factors which led to the rapid expansion of the juvenile
court system in America also allowed a number of abuses to arise. Regulation of
"status offenses," disproportionate impact on lower-class juveniles, and lack of
procedural safeguards for juveniles all allowed inequitable results in juvenile
proceedings. These abuses led to the landmark 1967 Supreme Court decision, In re
Gault,42 which forced juvenile courts to abide by basic requirements of the
Constitution.43
The regulation of status offenses, while allowing the state to strike early against
potential contributions to juvenile delinquency, also led to unfair results. First, while
all juveniles were seen to require a supervised moral upbringing, female juveniles
were believed to be especially at risk." Young girls, because of existing societal
beliefs, needed more state protection.45 Therefore, a juvenile court would examine
more closely the upbringing of an allegedly delinquent girl and assert its powers to
rehabilitate a delinquent girl in many cases where a boy in the same situation would

35. Id. at 14-15.

36. See id. at 15.
37. See id.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See SIMONSEN&GORDON, supranote 4, at 170.
FED,supra note 21, at 15.
Id. at 17.
SmiONSEN&GORDON, supranote 4, at 171.

42. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
43. See id. at 5.
44. See FELD,supra note 21, at 15.
45. See id. Feld notes that young girls were believed to be more susceptible to immoral behavior, because greater
pressures would be placed on girls than boys. See id.
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be ignored.' A second unfair result of state regulation of status offenses was the
severity of the terms of rehabilitation for sometimes very minor infractions.47 In
effect, there were no limitations on judges who imposed severe sanctions on status
offenders in the "best interest" of the child.
An even more disturbing result of the new juvenile court proceedings was the
disproportionate impact of rehabilitation on lower-class juveniles. Judges focused on
these juveniles, like female status offenders, as requiring more "parental"
supervision.' Parents who were immigrants or who were poor "could not be
expected to adequately Americanize their children, and state supervision was imposed
to assure that the next generation adopted an acceptable middle-class way of life."'49
In a country largely composed of immigrants, those who arrived earliest established
the requirements for being an "acceptable" American.
The final unfair result, which was the direct issue in In re Gault, was the lack
of procedural safeguards for juveniles.50 As stated earlier, status offenders often
suffered from unduly harsh dispositions, said to be in their "best interest."'51 In the
name of speed, flexibility, and increased understandability, the right to counsel and
other basic rights of criminal defendants were denied in juvenile proceedings.5 2 The
result was often that proceedings and dispositions were based upon the whims of a
particularjudgerather than upon knowledge derived from an increased understanding
of the juveniles' needs.53 However, as the Supreme Court stated in In re Gault,
"under our Constitution, the condition of being a Uuvenile] does not justify a
kangaroo court." 54
55
IV. THE "DuE PROCESS REVOLUTION"

Two prior decisions laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court's decision in
In re Gauli. First, the 1961 caseMapp v. Ohio,5 6 required the states to apply certain
basic Constitutional protections to criminal defendants.5 At issue in this case was
whether the procedural protections found in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-

46. For a detailed discussion on this point, see Anne Bowen Poulin, Female Delinquents: Defining Their Place
in the Justice System, 1996 WIS. L. REv. 541.
47. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussed in HuNMs, supranote 1, at24; FELD, supranote 21, at 18). In
this case, a 15 year old boy was found to be "habitually immoral" by a juvenile court and was sent to a state industrial

school until he turned 21. See idat 4. Theboy'scrimes: making one obscene phone call and being a suspect in the
theft of a baseball bat and glove two years earlier.
48. See FELD,supra note 21, at 15.
49. Id.
50. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
51. See id.
52. SIMONsE, supra note 4.
53. See FELD, supra note 21, at 15-16.
54. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 28.

55. This term comes from Feld's analysis of the changes brought about by the Warren Court's decisions regarding
the application of procedural protections to juvenile proceedings. See FELD, supranote 21, at 17.
56. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. See id. at 655.
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tion applied to state criminal proceedings." The Court ruled that these protections
did apply to the states, incorporated through the "due process" language of the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 9 Then, in 1966, the Supreme Court ruled that the holding
in Mapp would apply to all proceedings of a criminal nature.60 In Kent v. United
States,6 the court held that juvenile proceedings which require the "certification" of
a juvenile as an adult would involve the imposition of the same punishments as adult
criminal defendants would face.62 The Supreme Court stated that a juvenile in this
situation must be afforded due process rights, but only with respect to the certification proceeding. 63 The stage was thus set for the application of due process rights to
juvenile proceedings. 64
In response to the unavoidably arbitrary nature of the juvenile courts spawned
by the Progressive movement in the mid-1800s, the Supreme Court, in a series of
decisions between 1967 and 1975, created a new juvenile court system modeled after
the adult system. 6 The Court, in holding as it did, supported the primacy of
procedural rights over the rationale of the Progressives underlying the rehabilitative
juvenile court system. An analysis of these cases serves to highlight the Supreme
Court's rationale in holding as it did, and to forecast the soon to be realized future of
the juvenile court system.66
The Supreme Court, in In re Gault,67 held that juveniles were entitled to most
of the procedural protections available to adult criminal defendants.68 These
protections included the rights to assistance of counsel, a fair and impartial hearing,
advanced notice of charges, an adversarial proceeding, and the privilege against selfincrimination. 69 The two rationales enunciated by the Court for these fundamental
changes were ensuring accurate and reliable fact-finding, which, then, would lead to
more accurate decisions, and providing protection for the individual against the
powers of the state.7' However, a point that must be made here is that if the

58. See id.
59. See id.

60. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 553-54.
63. See id. at 554-55.
64. I examine the relevant text of the Constitutional Amendments, and the implications of that language in the
discussion that follows.
65. Simonsen and Gordon note a study in 1966, conducted by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, which revealed significant differences between the desired and actual court practices,
"[0from the time of their establishment, juvenile courts have been plagued with improperly defined goals, procedures
and jurisdictional boundaries." SIMONSEN & GoRDON, supranote 4, at 174-76.
66. Feld makes an excellent examination of the decisions by the Supreme Court during this period, from which I
borrow heavily. It would behoove the reader to read his more complete analysis if this period is of particular interest.
See FELD, supranote 21, at 17-39.
67. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 31-56; FELD, supra note 21, at 19.
70. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 51-52. The Constitutional basis for these rationales was the Fifth Amendment

which provides, in the relevant portion, that "[n]o person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." This provision was applied
to state actions through the Fourteenth Amendment "due process" guarantees. See FED, supra note 21, at 19-20.
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Progressive juvenile courts had not failed, no such decision would have been made.7'
If the rehabilitative court system had been successful in administering justice without
succumbing to abusive practices, there would have been no need for the In re Gault
decision.'
Two subsequent decisions handed down by the Supreme Court furthered the
application of procedural protections to juveniles. First, In re Winship,73 in 1970,
required juvenile courts to establish proof of delinquency "beyond a reasonable
doubt."74 This decision further eroded the Progressive conception that, "[i]ntervention was premised on the need for rehabilitation and social uplift, not on the
commission of an offense."75 The second decision, Breed v. Jones, 6 in 1975, held
that a juvenile could not be found delinquent in a juvenile court and then be tried for
the same offense in an adult court." To do so would violate the "double jeopardy"
clause of the Fifth Amendment.78 Both of these decisions applied formerly ignored
procedural rules to juvenile courts and strengthened the decision by the Court in In
re Gault to protect allegedly delinquent juveniles in much the same manner as adult
criminal defendants were protected. "By emphasizing criminal procedural regularity
in the determination of delinquency, the Supreme Court shifted the focus of the
juvenile court from the Progressive emphasis on the 'real needs' of the child to proof
of the commission of criminal acts, thereby effectively transferring juvenile
'
proceedings into criminal prosecutions."79
The systemic changes brought about by the decisions discussed above were
dramatic. Legal commentators would not realize how dramatic until public outrage
at juvenile crime in the mid-1970s and early 1980s forced the juvenile courts to get
80

tough.

The first response by Congress to the decision in In re Gaultand the other due
process cases ignored the inherent transformation ofjuvenile justice proceedings that
were required by these cases. In 1970, there were 2,662 juvenile courts in the United
States.8 ' In an attempt to provide a uniform system for the transition which In re
Gault required, Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act of 1974.82 Senator Birch Bayh, the chief architect of the legislation, said it was
"designed specifically to prevent young people from entering our failing juvenile

71. The Supreme Court shows obvious distaste when referring to the actual practices of the Progressive juvenile
courts. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-28.
72. Bernard would probably characterize this change as spurred more by the failure of the Progressive system to

"cure" the problem ofjuvenile crime; and, therefore, the cycle is returning toward more harsh punishment for juvenile
offenders. See BERNARD, supranote 5.
73. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
74. See id. at 368.
75. FaD,supra note 21, at 24.
76. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
77. See id. at541.

78. "No person shall.., be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" U.S. CoNSr.,
amend. V.
79.
80.
81.
82.

FLaD, supra note 21, at 24.
See IRAM. ScHWARZ, (IN)Jus-ncEFoRJuvEMLas 7 (1987).
SmioNSEN & GORDON, supranote 4, at 173.
See S.Rm.No.93-1011 (1974).
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justice system, and to assist communities in developing more sensible and economic
approaches for youngsters already in the juvenile justice system. 8 3 Congressional
intent in this 1970s legislation seemed to be similar to that of the Progressives in the
mid- 1800s, in that rehabilitation was still the goal of juvenile courts.8 4 "Communitybased programs" and an "Office of Juvenile Justice" would replace the role of the
judge in the old system insetting the juveniles on a better, and non-delinquent, path. 5
Since Congress had no enumerated power by which it could require the states to
adopt the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, the Act authorized the
of federal funds to states which achieved specific objectives set out in the
distribution
86
Act.
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 could have
required rehabilitative measures for status offenders and juveniles, by mandating
certain objectives for both, coupled with the "carrot and stick" approach of providing
federal funds for state implementation of the Act.87 Congressional intent appeared
to be consistent with this possible result.8 8 However, while the Act mandatedthat
status offenders could not be held in adult jails, detention centers, or training schools,
it merely encouraged the development of community-based alternatives to the
institutionalization of delinquents. 89 The effect of this distinction could be seen when
analyzed in conjunction with the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault.
This decision, as stated earlier, effectively transformed juvenile proceedings into
criminal prosecutions by applying to juvenile proceedings the Constitutional
safeguards against biased fact-finding and governmental oppression." However, for
the states to receive federal funding under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, state courts were required to prohibit any sanctions against status
offenders that would result in that offender being incarcerated. Therefore, state
action against status offenders necessarily would belimited to less severe, "rehabilitative" measures. 9 ' Not only would the punishments be severely limited, but also, the
heightened standards of proof imposed upon juvenile proceedings by In re Winship
would make a finding that the accused did commit a status offense in these cases
more difficult.92 There could be no effective punishment of status offenders, which

83. S HwAR'z, supranote 80, at 4.
84. See S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283. "The Committee bill, as
amended, provides for federal leadership and coordination of the resources necessary to develop and implement at the
State and local community level effective programs for the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency." Id.
85. SCHwART_ supra note 80, at 4.
86. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5632 (1974)).
87. ScHwARTz, supra note 80, at 4.
88. See Breed, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
89. See SChWARTZ, supra note 80, at 4.
90. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 51-52; see also BERNARD, supra note 5, at 114-18.
91. The argument that a state would not have to follow the federal guidelines generally is moot. When federal
funding has been made dependent upon some state action in the past, it was only a matter of time before the state took
that action. See generally Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987).
92. See In re Winship, 397 US 358 (1970).
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was at odds with the new "criminal" structure of the juvenile court.9 3 However, since
there were no prohibitions against incarceration of delinquents in the Act, a finding
of delinquency could result in the incarceration of the juvenile. In fact, punishing
juvenile offenders for their actions, through incarceration in institutions or detention
94
centers, would be a natural result of the newly "criminalized proceedings.
The Supreme Court decisions in Mapp, Kent, In re Gault, In re Winship, and
Breed,began a "due process revolution," which fundamentally changed the nature of
juvenile proceedings.9' When combined with Congress' Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, the result was a growing criminalization of
delinquency proceedings. Status offenses, however, could no longer be punished
effectively because of the mandates of the Act. This resulted in a separation of status
offenses from delinquency proceedings.'
The crininalization of delinquency
proceedings enforced the rationale that juveniles found delinquent should be punished
for their actions. Also, public pressure became a much more effective tool to force
legislators to make punishments for juveniles more severe.97 This public pressure
began to rise in the 1970s and early 1980s, based on "outrage over the juvenile crime
98
problem."
V. CYCLE BACK To GET TOUGH
"The Supreme Court's idea was to give juveniles the best of both worldstreatment withdueprocess. Instead, the get-tough movement gave juveniles the worst
of both worlds-punishment without due process." 99 Why the get-tough movement
occurred, beyond the basic reaction of a society to what was seen as soaring rates of
criminal activity, is beyond the scope of this paper. An analysis of how get-tough
measures were implemented in the juvenile justice system, however, will provide a
meaningful background to the status of thecurrent system. The changes to Oklahoma
juvenile courts during the 1970s and 1980s serve as an accurate reflection of national
trends.
As previously stated, the 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
was passed to provide a uniform system that states could use in changing their
juvenile courts to comply with the new due process requirements. A second purpose
for this Act was to increase the attention given to the study of juvenile justice in

93. The general purpose of criminal proceedings is to punish the criminal and to deter further crimes. See FED,
supranote 21, at 262.
94. SCHWARnz, supra note 80, at 16-18.
95. See BERNARD, supranote 5, at 109.
96. Simonsen and Gordon note this change by examining legislation in the various states. See SIMONSEN &
GORDoN,supra note 4, at 177. Table 9-1 lists thejurisdictionsthat have prohibited pre-adjudication detention and post-

adjudication commitment of status offenders, by the effective year ofthei'espective states' statutes. See id. As shown
in this table, post-adjudication commitment of status offenders was prohibited in all but one state by 1978. See id.
97. See BERNARD, supranote 5,at 133.
98. ScHwARTz, supra note 80, at 7.

99. BERNARD, supra note 5, at 151.
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America.l°" The idea behind the second purpose was that increased study would lead
to greater knowledge, which, in turn, would lead to ideas for improvement. 01' One
such study, entitled JuvenileJustice andDelinquen6yPrevention,was published by
the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in 1976.
In the language of the Committee, the findings of this study relating to juvenile
10 2
delinquency trends were "startling," "frightening," and "disturbing."'
From 1960 to 1974, the number of juveniles arrested increased 140%.1"3
Nationwide, juveniles accounted for 31% of all felony arrests in 1974.104 Numbers,
alone, show a powerful reason why the get-tough movement began.
Public outrage over this apparent increase in juvenile crime focused not on
underlying social and economic trends to explain the changes, but rather on the
perceived failure of the juvenile justice system. 5 A politically expedient solution
was to focus on the treatment of juvenile delinquents by juvenile courts. "Juvenile
court was portrayed as a 'kiddie court"' which could not punish these young
criminals effectively.' 0 6 This public sentiment created a political advantage for those
law-makers who would punish a juvenile based solely on the crime committed.' 07 The
newly criminalized structure of the juvenile court proved to be easily adaptable;
rehabilitation gave way to punishment.
State legislatures enacted several types of get-tough measures during the mid
1970s and early 1980s. Laws describing the purpose of the juvenile courts were
changed to include the punishment of offenders, not just treatment and the best
interests of the juvenile. Various mandatory sentences were passed for particular
kinds of crimes. The number of ways to transfer juveniles to criminal court was
increased, where juveniles presumably would be treated more harshly. Some of those
waivers were made mandatory. Jurisdiction over some offenses was transferred out
of the juvenile court all together and placed in criminal court, and some states
provided the death penalty for juveniles.'0 8 Oklahoma law-makers followed the gettough trend.
The original purpose for creating a separate juvenile court system in Oklahoma
was to treat and rehabilitate juveniles, consistent with the ideals of the Progressive
movement.'0 9 Laws passed following the Supreme Court decision in In re Gault,
applied the due process requirements imposed by that decision but still included

100. TASK FORCEON JUVENILEJUSICEAND DELINQUENCYPREVENION, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDs AND GOALs, REPORT OF A TASK FORCE ON JUVENU.E JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 1

(1976).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1.
103. See id. at3.

104. See id. at2.
105. See BERNARD, supranote 5,at 150.
106. See id. at 147.
107. See id.

108. See id.
109. See Okla. Comp. Lawsch. 13, art. I, § 603 (1909). "As faras practicable, any delinquent child shall betreated,
not as a criminal, but as misdirected and misguided, and needing aid, encouragement, help and assistance." Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1998

11

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 34 [1998], Iss. 3, Art. 8
610

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34:599

rehabilitation as the purpose of Oklahoma juvenile courts."' The language from
1968 is still in the Oklahoma Statutes."' However, in 1982 the legislature added

another section to the Juvenile Code, demonstrating a changed intent." 2 Legislative
intent now placed emphasis on the prevention of delinquency, along with rehabilitation." 3 Later, the legislature added protection of the public as a third purpose of
juvenile courts." 4 After 80 years of legislative intent that the juvenile courts work
solely to rehabilitate juveniles, suddenly prevention of delinquency and protection of
the public were added.
Complementing the shifting legislative intent toward punishment of juvenile

offenders, Oklahoma law-makers effectively increased the number of ways to transfer
juveniles to criminal court. Procedures for the certification of juveniles as adults have

been in effect since Oklahoma's first laws establishing the separate juvenile court." 5
This procedure remained the same until the due process requirements for juvenile
courts pushed the legislature to make this process more definite. "6 These guidelines
suggested factors the court should weigh during the certification hearing, including:
seriousness of the offense, aggressive, or premeditated nature of the offense, whether
the offense was against person or property, sophistication and maturity of the
juvenile, and prospects for rehabilitation. " 7 At this time, the legislature did not list
any specific crimes for which certification should or must be considered.
In 1978, that changed. Eleven crimes were listed for which juvenile courts were
required to weigh certification."' Also included in this new legislation was the
requirement that all sixteen and seventeen year olds charged with any of these eleven

110. See 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 282, § 129. "As far as practicable, any delinquent child shall not be treated as
a criminal" Id.
111. SeeOKLA.STAT. tit. 10,§ 1129(1991).
112. See 1982 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 312, § 29. "It is the intent of the Legislature of this state to provide for the
creation of all reasonable means and methods that can be established by a statefor the prevention ofdelinquency and
for the care and rehabilitation of delinquent children" (emphasis added). Id.
113. See id.
114. See 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 296, § 15. "It is the intent of the Legislature of this state to provide for the
creation of all reasonable means and methods that can be established by a state for- 1. the prevention of delinquency;
2. the care and rehabilitation of delinquent children; and 3. the protectionof the public." Id.(emphasis added).
Two interesting precursors to this changed legislative intent may be seen in the 1968 Session Laws and the 1975
Session Laws. In 1968, the Oklahoma legislature added a provision to the Juvenile Code which mandated review of
court ordered placementofthosejuveniles adjudicated delinquent. In this provision, the reasons given for the mandated
review were "to determine the type of placement best suited to the child and, in the case of children who have violated
state law, to theprotectionofthepublic." 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 282, § 135(a) (emphasis added). In 1975, the
OklahomalegislaturepassedResolutionNo. 13,entitledJuvenileDelinquency-PreventionProgram. 1975 Okia.Sess.
Laws S. J. Res. No.13, p. 7 6 0 . The findings of this resolution highlight the growing rate ofjuvenile crime, and the
purpose for the resolution was for prevention and protection along with rehabilitation. See id.
115. See Okla. Comp. Laws ch. 13, art. I, § 601 (1909). "The court may, however, in its discretion cause such child
to be proceeded against in accordance with the laws that may be in force goveming the commission of crime." Id.
116. See 1973 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 227, § 1. The guidelines, originally thought to be mandated by the Supreme
Court, were later held to be dicta. See also State ex rel. Coats v. Rakestraw, 610 P.2d 256,258 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980), overruling Sherfield v. State, 511 P.2d 598 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
117. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,566-67 (1966).
118. See 1978 Okla.Sess.Lawsch.23 1,§2. Theelevencrimeswere: "murderkidnapingforpurposesofextortion,
robbery with a dangerous weapon, rape in the second degree, use offirearm orotheroffensive weapon while committing
a felony, arson in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, burglary with explosives, shooting with intent to kill,
manslaughter or nonconsensual sodomy." Id.
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crimes were to be held in adult jail and be afforded "all the statutory and constitutional rights and protections of an adult accused of a crime."' 9 Procedural changes
requiring juvenile courts to hold certification hearings for certain crimes, along with
treating those juveniles accused of such crimes as criminal defendants had two
effects. First, more juveniles faced mandatory certifications, and, therefore, criminal
punishment. Second, the treatment of juveniles as criminal defendants continued the
criminalization of juvenile proceedings, reinforcing the goal of criminal courts to
punish offenders.
Creating mandatory certification hearing requirements was not the end of gettough measures in Oklahoma. Indeed, the next step taken created a new category of
juveniles who would be charged as adults, while at the same time, it limited the
jurisdiction of juvenile courts.
In 1980, the jurisdiction of Oklahoma juvenile courts was limited by a new
statutory definition of the term "child."'2 0 Persons sixteen or seventeen years old who
committed any of ten' specified offenses became adults in the eyes of the law and
were automatically tried in criminal courts. " There existed provisions for "reverse
certification," through which these adults could again become children. " However,
the purpose and outcome of this new definition of "child" was an increased
jurisdiction of criminal courts over juveniles, and punishment at the expense of
rehabilitation. This strategy has been popular for those who would take what may
be seen as the worst offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 24 Juvenile
courts would be free to deal with the less serious offenders, who would be, in this
view, more amenable to treatment.
In response to rising juvenile crime rates, with at least one report showing
disturbing increases,"2 legislators in the 1970s and 1980s found get-tough on crime
measures to be popular with the public. Tougher measures included transferring
more juveniles to criminal court to face criminal punishment, through both
certification of juveniles as adults and changing the definition of juvenile to broaden
the jurisdiction of criminal' courts. The new juvenile justice system, which
implemented the due process requirements imposed by the Supreme Court, was

119. Id.§l.
120. See 1980 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 242, § 1.

121. The ten specified offenses were: "murder, kidnaping for purposes of extortion, robbery with a dangerous
weapon, rape in the first degree, use of a firearm or other offensive weapon while committing a felony, arson in the first
degree, burglary with explosives, shooting with intent to kill, manslaughter or nonconsensual sodomy" --- the same
which previously would have resulted in an automatic certification hearing, except burglary in the first degree. Id.
122. See id.
123. See Tom R. Cornish, Where Have All The ChildrenGone?-Reverse Certiflcation,35 OKLA. L. REv. 373
(1982), for a discussion on the history and implementation ofreverse certification in Oklahoma. Mr. Cornish notes that

the original provisions, passed in 1978, were void for vagueness; and, that the Oklahoma legislature responded with
new provisions in 1979. See id.at 382. And although Mr. Cornish concluded with the fear that reverse certification
in any form may pose serious constitutional issues, these provisions have become increasingly popular in Oklahoma

and nationwide. See id. at 400.
124. As quoted in Cornish, the Daily Oklahoman ran an editorial in 1982 stating, "The time has come for the
Oklahoma Legislature to recognize the reality of so much violent crime being committed by persons under 18. The
clearly indicated remedy: for felony offenses, lower the age for trial as an adult from 18 to 16." Id. at 374, n.6.
125. See TASK FORCE ONJuVENLEJusncEAND DaiNQuENCYPREvENnoN, supra note I00.
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transformed from "the best of both worlds" to the "worst of both worlds."' 26 Treating
juvenile offenders as adult criminal defendants with procedural protections became
a rationale for punishing juveniles as adult criminal defendants. As will be seen, the
get-tough movement in Oklahoma and nationwide continues, as public fears about the
crime problem and lack of effective solutions grow.
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF JUVENILE LAW IN OKLAHOMA

According to one Oklahoma commentator, "[f]rom 1983 to 1992, violent crimes
committed by Oklahoma's juveniles skyrocketed 262%."'" Media coverage of
violent crimes, often portraying juvenile offenders as sophisticated and hardened
criminals, has been prevalent over the past several years. 28 Again and again, the
problem has been defined as an inadequate juvenile justice system; the answer has
been getting tough on crime. The most recent solution proposed by the Oklahoma
legislature is the Youthful Offender Act. 29 Passed in 1994, and funded in 1997,130
this Act became effective January 1, 1998.13 So, what is the current state of juvenile
delinquent law in Oklahoma?
Since January 1, 1998, three separate definitions exist for persons under
eighteen years of age who are accused of violating Oklahoma state statutes or
municipal ordinances: juveniles, youthful offenders, and adults.'3 2 Categorizing an
accused into one of the three definitions initially will depend upon the law the accused
has been charged with violating.'33 Final categorization, however, will depend upon
the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or denying motions to certify the accused
to a different category. 34 Discussing how an accused may fit into each particular
definition serves to demonstrate the important differences between each. Next, a
general analysis of the process of certification will illuminate that important part of
Oklahoma juvenile law. Then, with this background, a discussion of the intricacies
of juvenile, youthful offender, and adult proceedings with respect to persons under
eighteen will follow. In that way, the general concepts and specific processes of the
Youthful Offender Act can bee seen in an understandable fashion.

126. See ScEwATZ, supranote 80, at 151.
127. Edward L Thompson, Juvenile Delinquency: A Judge'sView ofOurPast,Present,and Future,46 OKLA.
L.REV. 655 (1993). JudgeThompson based this statistic onjuvenile arrest totals for those years: 502 arrests in 1983

compared to 1317 arrests in 1992. See id. at 655, n.3.
128. See generallyScHwARTz, supranote 80, at 23-34.
129. See 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 290, §§ 18-28.
130. See 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 311, § 15 (providing $3.3 million in funding); 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 330,
§ 1 (providing $4 million in funding).
131. See OKLA.STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.1 (Supp. 1997).
132. See id. § 7301-1.3(4) (defining who may be charged as a juvenile); id. § 7306-2.2(A)(1) (defining who may
be charged as a youthful offender); id. § 7306-2.4(A) (defining who may be charged as an adult).

133. See id. §§ 7301-1.3(4), 7306-2.2(A)(1), 7306-2.4(A).
134. See id. § 7303-4.3(B) (certifying ajuvenile asan adult); id. § 7306-2.6(B) (certifying ajuvenile as a youthful
offender); id. § 7306-2.5(A) (adult certified as either a juvenile or youthful offender).
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A. Three SeparateDefinitions
Oklahoma juvenile courts have jurisdiction over those persons defined as
juveniles. 35 The actual definition of a juvenile given in Title 10 of the Oklahoma
Statutes is phrased in negative terms; that is, a juvenile is any person under eighteen
years of age who is not a youthful offender and not an adult. 36 So, a person may be
categorized as a juvenile in several different ways. First, a person under eighteen
may be charged with having violated any state statute or municipal ordinance other
than those which automatically result in being charged as a youthful offender or an
adult.3 7 Second, a person may be categorized a juvenile purely by virtue of age. If
young enough, an accused cannot be charged automatically as a youthful offender or
an adult. 38 However, in either of these first two scenarios if the juvenile has been
accused of committing a felony, the district attorney and the court have discretion to
1 39
make a motion for certification of such juveniles as adults.
Also qualifying as juveniles are those persons under eighteen who initially fit
the definition of youthful offenders or adults, but who, because of prosecutorial or
judicial discretion, come into the definition ofjuvenile. First, a person old enough and
charged with any of the twenty crimes which would normally result in being defined
as a youthful offender,'" may be a juvenile nevertheless. That is so, in most cases,
because "the district attorney may file a petition alleging the person to be a delinquent
or may file an information against the accused person charging the person as a
youthful offender."'' As discussed later, the exercise of this discretion is to be based
on the preliminary investigation performed upon all alleged youthful offenders. 4 2
Second, a person under eighteen charged as a youthful offender or as an adult may
fall under the definition of juvenile through the certification procedure. 4 3 Through
certification, the court has discretion as to the final definition of juvenile.

135. See id. § 7303-4.3(A).
136. See id. § 7301-1.3(4). This subsection provides:
'[c]hild' or 'juvenile' means any person under eighteen (18) years of age, except for any person
...
thirteen (13), fourteen (14) or fifteen (15) [or sixteen orseventeen] years ofage who is charged
with murder in the first degree pursuant to ...
Section 7306-1.1 ofthis title, orany individual who
has been certified as an adult pursuant to Section 7303-4.3 of this title... or any person fifteen
(15) years ofage or older and charged orcertified as ayouthful offender pursuant to the Youthful
Offender Act; provided that any person under eighteen years of age.. .who is not convicted after
certification as an adult pursuant to Section 7303-4.3 of this title, or any individual who is not
convicted as a youthful offender pursuant to the Youthful Offender Act, shall continue to be
subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Id.
137. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7301-1.3(4) (Supp. 1997).
138. See id. A person under fifteen years of age cannot be charged as a youthful offender. A person under thirteen

cannot be charged automatically as an adult for murder in the first degree. See id.
139. See id. § 7303-4.3(B). "[I]f a child is charged with delinquency as a result of an offense which would be a
felony if committed by an adult, the court... shall conduct a preliminary hearing.., to determine if the child should
be held accountable for his acts as if he were an adult." Id.
140. See id. § 7306-2.6(A)-(C).
141. Id. § 7306-2.6(C) (emphasis added).
142. See id.
143. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.6(E) (Supp. 1997) (certifying ayouthful offender as ajuvenile); id. § 7306-

2.5(C) (certifying a person charged automatically as an adult as a juvenile).
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The Youthful Offender Act provides a positive definition of who may be
charged as a youthful offender. 44 In most cases to be so charged, a person need only
fit the age requirements and be accused of committing one of the specified offenses.'45
Specifically, any person fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years of age who is charged
with any of twelve listed felonies "shall be held accountable for his acts as a youthful
offender."' 46 Likewise, any person sixteen or seventeen years of age who is charged
with any of eight listed felonies "shall be held accountable for his acts as a youthful
offender."' 47 Although the language appears to be mandatory, through use of the
word shall,the following subsection goes on to qualify that the decision to charge the
accused as a juvenile or youthful offender is at the discretion of the district
attorney. t" This is true "[e]xcept as provided in subsection G of Section 7306-2.4
of this title."' 49 So, a district attorney has discretion in all cases, unless the person
charged with committing one of the listed felonies previously has been prosecuted and
sentenced as a youthful offender.' In that case, the district attorney must charge the
accused as a youthful offender.'
If the district attorney decides to or is required to charge a person as a youthful
offender, that person, or the court, may motion for certification as a juvenile.'5 2 So,
a person is not defined as a youthful offender unless that person: (1) fits the age
requirement and is accused of committing one of the listed felonies; (2) is charged
as a youthful offender by the district attorney; and, (3) is not certified by the court
as a juvenile.
Finally, a person under eighteen may be defined as an adult under certain
circumstances. 5 3 In two separate ways, one who has not reached the age of majority
can be tried as an adult criminal defendant. 5 4 First, any person thirteen, fourteen,
fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen who is charged with first degree murder "shall be held
accountable for his acts as if he were an adult."' 5 However, as stated earlier, such

144. See id. § 7306-2.6(A)-(B).
145. See id.
146. Id. § 7306-2.6(A). The twelve listed felonies are: murder in the second degree, kidnaping for the purpose of

extortion, manslaughter in the first degree, robbery with a dangerous weapon or attempt thereof, robbery with a firearm
or attempt thereof, rape in the first degree or attempt thereof, rape by instrumentation or attempt thereof, forcible
sodomy, lewd molestation, arson in the first degree or attempt thereof, shooting with intent to kill, and discharging a

firearm, crossbow, or other weapon from a vehicle. See id.
147. Id.§7306-2.6(B). Theeightfelonieslistedinthissubsectionare: burglary in thefirstdegreeorattemptthereof,

aggravated assault and battery of a police officer, intimidating a witness, trafficking in or manufacturing illegal drugs,
assault or assault and battery with a deadly weapon, maiming, residential burglary in the second degree after two or

more delinquent adjudications for committing burglary in the first degree or residential burglary in the second degree,
and rape in the second degree. See id.
148. Seeid. 7306-2.6(C).

149. Id. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.6(C) (Supp. 1997).
150. See id. § 7306-2.4(G).
151. See id.

152. See id. § 7306-2.6(E).
153. See id. § 7303-4.3(B) (juvenile certified as an adult): see id. § 7306-2.5(A) (person automatically charged as
an adult certified as a juvenile).

154. See id. §§ 7303-4.3(B), 7306-2.5(A).
155. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.5(A) (Supp. 1997).
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a person may be certified by the court as a juvenile or youthful offender. 56 Second,
any person against whom a petition of delinquency is filed for an "offense which
would be a felony if committed by an adult," may be certified to stand trial as an
adult. 57 The district attorney and the juvenile court judge have the option of
requesting such a certification hearing. 15 ' Because of its importance in determining
the final definition in which an accused may fit, the certification process in the
Oklahoma Juvenile Code will be the next topic addressed.
B. Certificationas Juvenile, Youthful Offender, or Adult
As mentioned earlier, a person under eighteen who has been categorized as a
juvenile, a youthful offender, or an adult on the basis of the alleged offense may be
certified by the court to a different category. Certification, therefore, may mean the
difference between mandatory release by the age of nineteen, required in the juvenile
system,5 9 limited prison time, available when sentenced as a youthful offender,' 60 or
life imprisonment or even the death penalty, both of which are available when
sentenced as an adult.' 6 ' Additionally, under the provisions of the Youthful Offender
Act, a youthful offender may be certified as eligible for the imposition of an adult
criminal sentence. 6 Because all certification provisions in the Oklahoma Juvenile
Code require a court hearing at which substantially the same seven factors are to be
weighed by the court in ruling on certification, the process may be discussed
generally. Then it will be useful to highlight the few differences that a particular
motion for certification will involve.
When ruling on a certification motion, the court shall give consideration to
seven guidelines provided by the Oklahoma legislature. 63 These seven guidelines
were codified virtually verbatim from eight criteria suggested by the United States
Supreme Court in the appendix to the holding in Kent v. United States. 64 What is
puzzling, however, and will be discussed later, are the slight, but possibly important,

156. See id. However, the statute does not allow certification as a juvenile if previously:
1. The child or youthful offender has been certified to stand trial as an adult pursuant to any
certification procedure provided by law; or,

2. The youthful offender has been certified for the imposition of an adult sentence... and is
subsequently convicted of the alleged offense or against whom the imposition of judgment and

sentencing has been deferred.
Id. § 7306-2.4(F).
157. Id. § 7303-4.3(B).
158. See id.
159. See id. § 7302-5.4(B).

160. See id. § 7306-2.9(B).
161.
OKA.
162.
163.

FELD, supranote 21. In these cases, the person "shall be held accountable for his acts as if he were an adult."
STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.5(A) (Supp. 1997).
See OKL. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.8(A)-(D) (Supp. 1997).
See id. § 7303-4.3(B) (certifying a juvenile as an adult); id. § 7306-2.5(D) (certifying an adult as either a

juvenile oryouthful offender); id. § 7306-2.6(E)(3) (certifying a youthful offender as ajuvenile); id. § 7306-2.8(C)(2)
(certifying a youthful offender for the imposition of an adult criminal sentence).
164. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court held in this case that the certification
process, because it involved the possibility of a person having to face criminal punishment, must comply with due

process requirements. See id. at 553-54.
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textual differences between the seven guidelines listed at several points throughout the
Oklahoma Juvenile Code." 5 Finally, although consideration of the seven guidelines

is mandatory, the court, in its decision on the certification motion, need not detail
responses to each consideration; the court only must state that it has considered
each.'6
The guidelines for certification focus on three main areas: the nature of the
offense committed, the prospects for rehabilitation of the accused, and protection of

the public. 67 Generally, the court will hold a certification hearing in conjunction with
a preliminary determination of the prosecutive merit of the claim. If the certification
hearing is in juvenile court, this preliminary inquiry is called a prosecutive merit

hearing;16t if it is in criminal court, it is called a preliminary hearing.' 69 In either
case, the state presents evidence that the accused committed the crime in question. 7 °

The accused then must offer evidence in favor of certification as a juvenile or
youthful offender, or against certification as an adult."' Following the evidence
presented by the defense at a prosecutive merit hearing, the juvenile court judge will
rule on whether there is prosecutive merit before ruling on certification.' 72 The
converse is true in criminal court. Following the evidence presented by the defense
at a preliminary hearing, the judge "shall rule on the certification motion of the
accused person before ruling on whether to bind the accused over for trial."' 1 3 These
different approaches are employed so as to limit the exposure a juvenile will have
with criminal court in the event that the court either does not find prosecutive merit

or certifies the accused as a juvenile.

165. See OKLA.STAT. tit. 10, §§ 7303-4.3(B), 7306-2.5(D), 7306-2.6(E)(3), 7306-2.8(C)(2) (Supp. 1997).
166. See, e.g., id. § 7303-4.3(B).
167. See id. Although there are minor textual differences between each ofthe provisions which list the seven factors,
the following quote is representative of each:
a. the seriousness of the alleged offense to the community, and whether the alleged offense was
committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner,
b. whether the offense was against persons or property, greater weight being given to offenses
against persons, and if personal injury resulted, the degree of personal injury,
c. the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile and his capability of distinguishing right from
wrong as determined by consideration of his psychological evaluation, home, environmental
situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living,
d. the record and previous history of the accused person, including previous contacts with
community agencies, law enforcement agencies, schools, juvenile courts and otherjurisdictions,
prior periods of probation or prior commitments to juvenile institutions,
e. the prospects for adequate protection of the public,
f. the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile if he is found to have committed the
allegedoffense, by the use ofprocedures and facilitiescurrently available to thejuvenile court, and
g. whether the offense occurred while the accused person was escaping or in an escape status from
an institution for delinquent children.
Id. § 7306-2.6(E)(3)(a)-(g).
168. See id. §7303-4.3(B).
169. See, e.g., § 7306-2.5(C)(I)-(2). Recall that the reason for the difference in language stems from the original
separation of juvenile proceedings from criminal proceedings.
170. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7303-4.3(B) (Supp. 1997).
171. See, e.g., § 7306-2.5(C)(2).
172. See id. § 7303-4.3(B). "If the court finds that prosecutive merit exists, it shall continue the hearing for a
sufficient period of time to conduct an investigation and further hearing to determine if the child should be held
accountable for his acts as if he were an adult... " Id.
173. Id. § 7306-2.5(D).
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The question remains as to which party must prove what to prevail at a
certification hearing. In answering this question, the Oklahoma legislature has
provided two separate responses. In the first response, the legislature provided
relatively clear burdens of persuasion and proof imposed upon the process of
certifying an accused to the status of an adult criminal defendant. 74 To certify a
person under eighteen as an adult or eligible to receive an adult sentence, the district
attorney must convince the court why that person must receive an adult sentence, and
must do so by clear and convincing evidence. 75 In the converse situation, certifying
a person under eighteen as ineligible for adult criminal punishment, the Oklahoma
legislature has not provided such a clear allocation of burdens. 7 6 In this second
situation, the burden to produce evidence initially rests upon the state, that much is
clear.'" However, the only provision in the statute which tells what the court must
178
be persuaded of is by inference through the seven guidelines listed above.
Additionally, no standard of proof has been provided to establish how much proof is
required. 179 A simple explanation for these differences is the level of due process
required in the juvenile and adult system. A court may be free to exercise greater
discretion in deciding to transfer a person to a less punitive proceeding; whereas, a
decision to transfer a person to a more punitive proceeding must not be arbitrary or
influenced by the coercive power of the state. That is why the procedures are more
structured for the latter form of certification.'80
Certification of a person under eighteen is the final stage in categorizing that
person as a juvenile, a youthful offender, or an adult. In all cases, when ruling on
certification, the court is required to consider seven guidelines. These guidelines hold
important the nature of the alleged offense, the prospects for rehabilitation of the
accused, and protection of the public. In conjunction with the certification hearing,
the state must present evidence that the accused committed the crime in question. If

174. See id. § 7303-4.3(B) (certifying a juvenile as an adult); id. § 7306-2.8(D) (certifying a youthful offender as
eligible for the imposition of an adult criminal sentence). Recall that the burden of persuasion refers to what the court
must be convinced ofby evidence produced. The burden of proof, then, refers to the standard by which the court must

be convinced of something.
175. See id. §7303-4.3(B) (providing "thecourtmay in itsdiscretionproceedwiththejuvenileproceedingoritshall
state its reasons in writing and shall certify, based on clear and convincing evidence, that such child shall be held
accountable for his acts as if he were an adult"). Similarly, § 7306-2.8(D) provides:
the court shall certify the person as eligible for the imposition of an adult sentence only if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that there is good cause to believe that the accu sed person would
not reasonably complete a plan of rehabilitation or that the public would not be adequately

protected if the person were to be sentenced as a youthful offender.
Id. § 7306-2.8(D).
176. See OMA. STAT. tit. 10. § 7306-2.5(C)-(D) (Supp. 1997) (certifying an adult asayouthful offenderorjuvenile);

id. § 7306-2.6(E) (certifying a youthful offender as a juvenile).
177. See id. §§ 7306-2.5(C)-(D), 7306-2.6(E). In both cases, the state is required to produce evidence of the crime

committed. Then, "at the conclusion ofthe state's case... the accused person may offer evidence to support the motion
for certification as a [youthful offender or juvenile]." Id. §§ 7306-2.5(C)-(D), 7306-2.6(E) (emphasis added).
178. See id. § 7303-4.3(B) (certifying a juvenile as an adult); id. § 7306-2.5(D) (certifying an adult as either a
juvenile or youthful offender); id. § 7306-2.6(E)(3) (certifying ayouthful offender as ajuvenile) id. § 7306-2.8(C)(2)

(certifying a youthful offender for the imposition of an adult criminal sentence).
179. See id. §§ 7303-4.3(B), 7306-2.5(B), 7306-2.6(E)(3), 7306-2.8(C)(2).
180. But see Cornish, supra note 123 (arguing that both forms of certification should be structured to formally
comply with due process requirements).
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the state is moving to transfer the accused to a more punitive proceeding, it must
convince the court why that is necessary by clear and convincing evidence. If the
certification hearing involves transferring the accused to a potentially less punitive
proceeding, the court has greater discretion in ruling on the motion. A discussion of
what happens once the categorization is final will conclude the analysis of the current
state of juvenile law in Oklahoma.
C. Impact of Categorizationas Juvenile, Youthful Offender, or Adult
Once the final categorization of a person under eighteen charged with violating
a state statute or municipal ordinance has been determined, that person either will
face juvenile proceedings or criminal proceedings. A discussion of the technicalities
of each is beyond the scope of this paper; rather, the following analysis will focus on
the disposition of juveniles adjudicated delinquent and the sentencing of youthful
offenders and adults found guilty. The vast differences in punitive and rehabilitative
measures available will fuel the following critical examination and suggestions for
change.
As stated earlier, Oklahoma juvenile courts have jurisdiction over those persons
who have been categorized as juveniles.' 8 ' Oklahoma law, following a national trend
in the 1970s, has separated juveniles alleged to be status offenders from those found
to be delinquent. 8 2 This distinction, however, is only important in the disposition
phase. Before being tried in a juvenile court, a juvenile will undergo a "mandatory,
preadjudicatory interview," generally referred to as intake, through which an officer
of the court will make a preliminary determination of what action the court should
take next.183 Then, depending greatly upon the recommendations of the intake officer,
the court may hold an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the allegations
against the juvenile are supported by the evidence.' 84 If a juvenile is found to be
delinquent, or "in need of supervision" for status offenses, that child will become a
ward of the court.'8 5 Juvenile court officers must then formulate a disposition plan
through which the goals of prevention, rehabilitation, and protection of the public will
be integrated. 8 6 Finally, at the disposition hearing, the court will impose a
disposition plan upon the juvenile who formerly was made a ward of the court, based
87
to a great extent upon the recommendations of the officers preparing the report.

181. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.3(A) (Supp. 1997); supranote 135 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 77 and surrounding text. In Oklahoma, status offenders are called "children in need of
supervision." OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7301-1.3(6) (Supp. 1997).
183. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7301-1.3(25) (Supp. 1997) (defining "preliminary inquiry" and "intake").
184. Id. § 7301-1.3(1). Recall that proofofdelinquencymustbebeyondareasonabledoubtaftertheSupreme Court
case In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
185. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7301-1.3(1) (Supp. 1997). The language supporting the notion of a separate juvenile
court with the state as ultimate parent still exists, even if the punishment rationale now predominates. See supranote
31 and accompanying text.
186. See id.§ 7302-5.3(A).
187. See id. § 7301-1.3(14) (defining dispositional hearing); id. § 7302-5.3 (providing disposition options, to be
employed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, a part of the Office of Juvenile Affairs).
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Oklahoma juvenile courts may impose any of seven options for the disposition
of a juvenile made a ward of the court.' 8 The least severe option allows the juvenile
to return home, with periodic appearances in front of the court until the court is
satisfied that the three requirements of prevention, rehabilitation, and protection have
been ftlfilled.'" The most severe option which may be imposed is locking up a
juvenile in a maximum security facility for juvenile delinquents until that person has
reached age nineteen.'90 Most options contemplate temporary out-of-homeplacement
for the "ward" in a rehabilitative setting.' 9' The rationale of the state as ultimate
parent cannot be applied to thosepersons under eighteen prosecuted in criminal court.
The parent, so-to-speak, has given up.
Oklahoma criminal courts have jurisdiction over those charged as youthful
offenders or adults. 92 As such, the accused in both cases is provided all of the
"statutory and constitutional rights and protections of an adult accused of a crime."'9"
Procedurally, the accused is charged by information, 94 subjected to a preliminary
hearing and trial, if bound over for trial, 9 and sentenced as an adult and incarcerated
with the adult population in jail, if found guilty.' 96 The main distinction between
being tried as a youthful offender and an adult are the increased options a court has
in the event a youthful offender is found to be guilty, but not eligible for the
imposition of an adult sentence.
As discussed in the earlier section on certification, the district attorney "shall
file a motion for consideration of the imposition of the sentence as for an adult" in
certain circumstances.' 97 That is so if the district attorney "believes there is good
cause to believe" that in the absence of such punishment the accused will not be
rehabilitated or the public will not be adequately protected.'98 If the court denies the
motion, the youthful offender may still face adult punishment, but subject to a ten
year maximum sentence;' 99 however, the youthful offender still may benefit from
being eligible for a rehabilitation plan.2"
The Youthful Offender Act provides that the court, upon a finding of guilt, must
188. See id. § 7302-5.3(B)(1)-(7). These options are explained more definitely in § 7303-5.3(A).

189. See id. § 7302-5.3.
190. See id. § 7302-5.3(B)(1). Jurisdiction may be extended until age nineteen according to section 7302-5.4(B).

However, a child under ten may not be placed in a facility for delinquent children. See id. § 7302-5.4(C). Nor may
a juvenile adjudicated to be "in need of supervision" be placed in such a facility. See id. § 7303-5.3(B). Finally, no
juvenile adjudicated as delinquent foroffenses which would constitute misdemeanors if adult, may be placed in asecure
facility upon disposition. See id. § 7303-5.4(C).
191. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,§ 7302-5.3(B) (Supp. 1997).

192. See id. § 7306-2.4.
193. Id. § 7306-2.4(B).
194. See id.
§ 7306-2.4(A).

195. See id. § 7306-2.4(B).
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id.
§ 7306-2.4(E).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.8(A) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
Id.
See id.
§ 7306-2.9(B). Language in this provision also allows the court to impose a sentence "with regard to

the youthful offender as provided by law for the disposition of a child adjudicated delinquent." Id. This seems to be
inconsistent with the court's discretion in previously ruling on a motion for certification as a juvenile; that is, if the
court thought it was in the best interest that the person receive juvenile disposition, the court would certify the person

as a juvenile before the person was exposed to the time and inconvenience of criminal court.
200. See id. § 7306-2.10.
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again weigh the seven guidelines, but this time to determine whether the youthful
offender should be placed in the custody of Juvenile Affairs or merely under its
supervision.20" Although this Office is required to formulate a rehabilitation plan
"whenever a youthful offender is placed in the custody of or under the supervision of
the Office of Juvenile Affairs," a juvenile placed in the custody of the Office will be
placed in juvenile facilities after being sentenced. 2" However, a juvenile who is
merely under the supervision of the Office is still subject to incarceration in an adult
jail.2 3 The rehabilitation plan requires that the convicted youthful offender be
brought before the court on a semiannual basis, so that the court may monitor "the
youth's conduct, progress, and condition." 2' During thesehearings, the court has the
option of discharging the youthful offender, maintaining the status quo, changing the
offender's placement, or placing the offender permanently with the Department of
Corrections.2 5 Regardless of the court's determination, "[i]n no event shall the
sentence exceed the amount of time of a possible sentence for an adult convicted of
the same offense or ten (10) years, whichever is less."2 6 There are no such
limitations upon the sentencing of a person under eighteen certified as an adult or who
is otherwise eligible for the imposition of an adult sentence.
A person under eighteen who is categorized as an adult, or eligible for the
imposition of an adult sentence, will be treated as an adult in all proceedings
subsequent to a finding of guilt.2"7 Sentencing will be to adult jails with adult
inmates. In these cases, there is no rehabilitation plan through which the guilty
person will be monitored and forgiven, if rehabilitated. The Department of
Corrections does have some supervisory requirements, but has neither the facilities
nor the underlying rationale to provide for rehabilitation.
In concluding this statement of the current state of juvenile law in Oklahoma,
the purpose for the Youthful Offender Act offers an accurate overview of the
continuing progression of get-tough measures: "[i]t is the purpose of the Youthful
Offender Act to better ensure the public safety by holding youths accountable for the
commission of serious crimes, while affording courts methods of rehabilitation for
those youths the courts determine, at their discretion, may be amenable to such
methods."20 8 Both the juvenile courts and the Office of Juvenile Affairs, the state
agency in charge of rehabilitation of persons under eighteen, have been given the
flexibility to promote rehabilitation. However, in light of the get-tough trend, is it
legitimate to expect such action by these actors?
201. See id. § 7306-2.9(A).
202. See id. § 7306-2.11.

203. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.6(F) (Supp. 1997) (youthful offender may be incarcerated with the adult
population); id. § 7306-2.9(B) (stating that "the court may impose sentence as a youthful offender in the manner
provided by law for an adult for punishment of the offense committed"). Reading these two together, it is clear thatjail
time is not limited to those youthful offenders who are certified as eligible for the imposition of adult punishment.
204. Id. § 7306-2.10(B).

205. See id. §7306-2.10(F).
206. Id. § 7306-2.9(B).

207. See id. § 7306-2.4(E)-(M); see also id.§ 7306-2.8(E) (stating that "the person shall be treated as an adult for
purposes of supervision, incarceration and in all subsequent criminal proceedings").

208. Id. § 7306-2.2(B).
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VII. SOME CRITICISM, SOME SUGGESTIONS

The Youthful Offender Act and accompanying changes to the Oklahoma
Juvenile Code are substantially different from former provisions relating to
delinquency and criminal behavior by persons under-eighteen. One obvious change
was the creation of the "youthful offender" status. Instead of classifying most of the
persons under eighteen accused of serious offenses automatically as adults, the new
laws include youthful offender as an intermediate level between juvenile and adult.
The idea is that these youthful offenders may be punished as adults, but also
rehabilitated as juveniles. A second change is the adoption of nearly identical lists of
seven guidelines for the court to consider in making five different determinations
throughout juvenile, youthful offender, and adult proceedings. This change seems to
demonstrate a greater reliance upon the discretion of the court in determining what
is in the best interest of the accused. 9 Finally, the Office of Juvenile Affairs has
been removed from the mammoth Department of Human Services. Instead of
remaining a part of that larger agency, the Office was made separate and provided
with direct funding to be spent on rehabilitation of persons in its custody or under its
supervision."1 Along with discussing these changes, this paper will make suggestions
for implementation of the new laws.
The greatest problem that may arise from the recognition of youthful offenders
is the severity of punishment at the expense of rehabilitation. This new category,
however, may represent the biggest break, so far, from the "cycle of juvenile justice'
in Oklahoma.2 ' Although, the Youthful Offender Act was passed amid public
pressure to get tough, it does not fit easily within the cycle discussed at the beginning
of this paper. Punishment of a youthful offender will often be more strict than any
punishment available for juveniles;" however, both the sentencing of youthful
offenders and the disposition of delinquent juveniles will be monitored by the Office
of Juvenile Affairs. 213 This Office, through its Department of Juvenile Justice, will
plan, effect, and monitor the rehabilitation of both youthful offenders and delinquent
juveniles, albeit with approval of the plan by the court prior to implementation.214
The level of punishment increased, but so did the options for rehabilitation. In theory,
the cycle of juvenile justice will not continue.2 15

209. See supra notes 31-32 and surrounding text, for the underlying rationale of the separate system with the state
acting as the parent of the juvenile.
210. See 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 330, §§ 1-5.
211. See BERNARD, supra note 5, at 3. The Oklahoma laws will change the portion of the cycle stating that when
the rehabilitative measures are seen by the public as failing to bring about a reduction in juvenile crime, pressure is
placed on legislators to re-enact measures that will serve to punish juveniles for criminal activity. Then, the cycle
continues to require that punishments become increasingly harsh. See id.at 3-4.
212. See supra notes 188 & 192 and surrounding text.

213. See OKLA.STAT. tit. 10, § 7303-5.3(6) (Supp. 1997) (placing the Office in charge ofa delinquentjuvenile); id.
§ 7306-2.9(B)(1) (placing the Office in charge of youthful offenders).

214. See id. §§ 7303-5.3(6), 7306-2.9(B)(1).
215. See BERNARD, supra note 5. Although Bernard recommended the cycle be broken by halting the movement
"toward greater toughness," he stresses the need for flexible and well-funded treatment. Id. at 177-8 1.
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In practice, courts must be allowed to retain flexibility in the sentencing of
youthful offenders and the disposition of delinquent juveniles. And a necessary part
of being flexible is having the funds to provide alternatives. 1 6 First, how much
discretion will courts have under the new provisions of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code?
At first glance, the answer appears to be that courts will have greater discretion than
ever before. This is so because of the five separate provisions for hearings to be ruled
on by the court regarding issues of certification and sentencing.2 17 Discretion comes
in the five lists of guidelines which accompany each statutory provision regarding
such hearings." The court's decision in each type of hearing must give consideration
to the seven guidelines, which are general enough to allow a wide range of latitude.219
There are, however, three limitations which must be examined to clarify the extent of
judicial discretion.
One limitation comes from the very purpose given for the Youthful Offender
Act. The purpose for the Act contemplates "affording courts methods of rehabilitation for those youths the courts determine, at their discretion, may be amenable to
such methods." 0 However, the new and pervasive rationales of protection and
punishment are mentioned in the purpose first: "[i]t is the purpose of the Youthful
Offender Act to better ensure thepublic safety by holding youths accountable for the
commission of serious crimes." '' The idea is that courts may be less willing to
exercise discretion in favor of rehabilitation if they must adhere to the twin aims of
protection and punishment.
A second limitation may be found in the seemingly mandatory language
accompanying three "discretionary" hearing provisions in the Youthful Offender Act.
Specifically, the Oklahoma legislature provided that any person thirteen to seventeen
years of age who is charged with first degree murder "shall be held accountable for
his acts as if he were an adult. ' 2" Additionally, a person of the appropriate age and
charged with any of the felonies listed in subsection A or B of Section 7306-2.6 of
the Youthful Offender Act "shall be held accountable for his acts as a youthful
offender."' r Theproblemis that immediately following this mandatory language, the
legislature provided methods through which the court could certify the accused to less
punitive proceedings. This mandate also might limit the discretion a judge would be
willing to exercise, especially in light of the twin goals of protection and punishment

216. In fact, Edward Humes, after spending a year working in ajuvenile detention facility in Los Angeles, endorsed
three ways to improve the juvenile court system: (1) provide stricter punishment for first time offenders; (2) increase

the funding available for agencies and the court in dealing with juvenile delinquents; and, (3) allow juvenile judges
greater discretion in correcting juvenile behavior (Ala, Judge Roosevelt Dom, whose effective, but often extra-legal
methods were discussed at length). See HUMEs, supra note 1, at 363.
217. See OKLA.STAT. tit. 10, §§ 7303-4.3(B), 7306-2.5(D), 7306-2.6(E)(3), 7306-2.8(C)(2) (Supp. 1997). Along
with the four listed here, the final provision is in OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.9(A) (Supp. 1997) (pre-sentencing
investigation and hearing on that report).

218. See id. §§ 7303-4.3(B), 7306-2.5(D), 7306-2.6(E)(3), 7306-2.8(C)(2).
219. See id. §§ 7303-43(B), 7306-2.5(D), 7306-2.6(E)(3), 7306-2.8(C)(2).
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. § 7306-2.2(B).
Id.
Id. § 7306-2.5(A) (emphasis added).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7306-2.6(A)-(B) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
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discussed above.
Finally, a third limitation on the exercise of judicial discretion in certifying and
sentencing an accused is the existence of absolute limits. Three such limits have been
provided by the Oklahoma legislature. If a juvenile or youthful offender has been
certified as an adult, or if a youthful offender has been certified as eligible for the
imposition of an adult sentence and is convicted or receives a delayed or deferred
sentence, that person "shall be tried as an adult in all subsequent criminal prosecutions, and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or youthful
offender process." 4 Additionally, a person prosecuted and sentenced as a youthful
offender shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in subsequent
proceedings of a criminal nature.2" Any of these three conditions, if fulfilled, will
eliminate judicial discretion regarding certification and sentencing.
The effects of these limitations on the seemingly broad grant of judicial
discretion in the new Youthful Offender Act cannot be known at this time. However,
if courts are constrained by these limits to a great enough degree, their flexibility in
providing varying sentencing and disposition will be substantially limited.
A second requirement for flexibility is adequate funding. In May of 1997, the
Oklahoma legislature provided the newly independent Office of Juvenile Affairs with
over seven million dollars. 226 The money is to be used for a variety of programs and
facilities. 7 The more money this Office receives, the greater the variety and number
of options it can offer. The point must be noted, however, that although the Youthful
Offender Act was passed in 1994, it was not funded until 1997. The statutorily
mandated time for implementation was delayed twice because funding had not been
provided. So, just because the Act has been passed by the legislature mandating
certain functions be performed by the Office, that does not ensure the funding will be
provided in the future. And without adequate funding, the "procedures and facilities
currently available to the juvenile court" will be extremely limited.2' If there is no
funding for rehabilitation and too much constraint on judicial discretion, perhaps the
courts only will be able to accomplish two of the three purposes for the Youthful
Offender Act: punishment and protection of the public.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The development of juvenile law continues in Oklahoma with the implementation of the Youthful Offender Act and accompanying changes to the Juvenile Code.

224. Id. § 7306-2.4(F).
§ 7306-2.4(G).
225. See id.
226. See supranote 130 and surrounding text.
227. See 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch.330, § 1-5; 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch.311, §§ 15-19.
228. OKLA.STAT.tit 10, § 7306-2.5(D) (Supp. 1997). Thiscomes fromoneoftheguidelinesdiscussedabove. The
particular guideline it comes from states that the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation should be measured in

conjunction with services actually available. Although this seems to be practical, it also ensures that a court will not
be able to consider the likelihood ofrehabilitation if very limited rehabilitative resources have been provided for by the
legislature. This is particularly relevant in mitigating against a nasty crime or bad past record when weighing
certification or sentencing at one of the discretionary hearings.
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Although at least one author has commented on the negative, cyclical nature of
juvenile justice, Oklahoma has a chance to break this trend.
By providing for increased flexibility in treatment and sentencing, the Act
supports the proper rehabilitative character for juvenile disposition. Mechanisms for
punishment, however, arenot sacrificed. TheAct gets tough with thosejuveniles who
fail to respond to rehabilitative measures prescribed by the court, as well as those
who commit the most serious crimes. But most importantly, even those youthful
offenders who have been sentenced to prison are not abandoned; rather, the
rehabilitative effort continues because the Office of Juvenile Affairs must continue
to monitor their cases. Only those juveniles who are certified as adults, or who fail
the reverse certification procedure upon being charged as adults, or who previously
have served time in prison, are abandoned by the Office of Juvenile Affairs.
So, although the merits of the differentmechanisms used in various "get tough"
campaigns may be argued about well into the future, it is clear that Oklahoma has a
system that could be used to emphasize rehabilitation for most juveniles. Provided
that there is adequate funding for the Office of Juvenile Affairs, juveniles in
Oklahoma will get the chance to learn from their mistakes-the chance to continue
being the children that they are.
CraigJ. Herkal
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